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Three articles of the EEC Treaty establish the framework for EC 
policy on state aid. Article 92 outlines the basic principles:
Article 92
1. Save as otherwise provided in this Treaty, any aid granted by a 
Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which 
distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain 
undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it 
affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the common 
market.
2. The following shall be compatible with the common market:
(a) aid having a social character, granted to individual 
consumers, provided that it is granted without discrimination 
related to the origin of the products concerned;
(b) aid to make good the damage caused by natural disasters or 
exceptional occurrences:
(c) aid granted to the economy of certain areas of the Federal 
Republic of Germany...
3. The following may be considered to be compatible with the common 
market:
(a) aid to promote the economic development of areas where the 
standard of living is abnormally low or where there Is serious 
unemployment;
(b) aid to promote the execution of an important project of 
common European interest or to remedy a serious disturbance in 
the economy of a Member State;
(c) aid to facilitate the development of certain economic 
activities or of certain economic areas, where such aid does not 
adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the 
common interest. ...
(d) such other categories of aid as may be specified by decision 
of the Council acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from 
the Commission.
We begin by outlining the essential substantive and procedural 
elements of Community policy on state aid. We proceed to examine the 
definition of state aid and the evaluation of the effect of state aid 




























































































compensatory justification, which holds that a distortion of 
competition will be permitted only to accomplish some goal embodied in 
paragraph 2 or 3 of Article 92, and of applications of that principle.
Decisions taken under Articles 92(2) and (3) offer the prospect 
of revealing the circumstances in which the European Commission and 
the European Court of Justice are willing to accept distortions of 
competition to permit state aid. Identification of such circumstances 
will clarify the practical meaning of "distortion to competition" 
under the EEC Treaty and the purposes for which distortions to 
competition are permitted to accomplish other economic, social, and 
political goals and illustrate the changing relationship between 
competition policy and other Community policies.
II. Principles 
A. Substantive Principles
Article 92(1) prohibits aid which distorts or threatens to 
distort competition, and affects trade between member states. EC 
policy on state aid to industry is thus supposed to be subsidiary to 
EC competition policy, and to be an instrument in the implementation 
of the principle in Article 3 (f) of the Treaty that undistorted 
competition should prevail throughout the Community. It is only state 
aid that offends competition policy that is regulated under Article 92.
Article 92(2) specifies categories of aid that are compatible 
with the common market. It is for the Commission to decide whether or 
not this paragraph covers particular instances of aid:1
1. Advocate General Roemer in Case 77/72 Capolongo v. Azienda 
Agricola Maya (1973) ECR 611 at 627, (1972) 1 CMLR 230 at 236.




























































































Already In paragraph (2) there are exceptions; a series of aids 
is there explicitly termed compatible with the Common Market.
In this connection it is clear from the wording used 
('exceptional circumstances', 'compensation for the economic 
disadvantages caused by the division of Germany') that in so 
far as a considerable margin of discretion does exist, its 
exercise certainly cannot be left to the national courts but 
rather that it ought to be implemented in a uniform manner 
throughout the Community.
Article 92(3) specifies types of aid that may be considered 
compatible with the common market. In the words of Advocate General 
Warner,2
...Article 92 does not impose a clear and unconditional 
prohibition on State aids. It  imposes a prohibition tempered by 
the Commission's power to take economic, social and political 
considerations into account, and also by the powers given to the 
Council...
Thus the framework for implementation of state aid policy 
comprises a broad general principle prohibiting distortion of 
competition and certain exceptions from this prohibition on specified 
grounds.3 In the words of Advocate General Darmon,4 there is a
2. Case 78/76 Flrma Steinike und Welnllg v. Bundesamt fur Emahrung und 
Forstwirtschaft. (1977) ECR 595 at 582, (1977) 2 CMLR 688 at
699. At ECR 609, CMLR 714-715 the Court accepts this argument;
...the incompatibility of aid with the Common Market as provided 
in Article 92 (1) is neither absolute nor unconditional. Article 
92 (2) not only provides for exceptions but in addition both 
Article 92 and Article 93 give the Commission a wide discretion 
and the Council wide powers to accept State aid in derogation 
from the general prohibition in Article 92 (1).
3. Further types of aid may be specified by the Council under Article 
92(3)(d). So far, this power has been used only in the case of 
shipbuilding. Current rules are contained in Directive 87/167 OJ 1987 
L 69/55.
4. Case 248/84 Federal Republic of Germany v. E. C, Commission 




























































































"rebuttable presumption" that aid covered by Article 92(1) is 
incompatible with the common market and thus prohibited.
The practicalities of confining policy-making to such a framework 
are another matter. The rationale for the Article 92(3) exemptions is 
the pursuit of Community objectives.5 Where accomplishment of such 
objectives conflicts with the maintenance of competitive markets, 
policy may require the presumption in favor of competition to give 
way, or even to be reversed.
B. Procedural Concepts
Article 93 establishes procedures for implementation of the 
policy outlined in Article 92. It imposes on the EC Commission the 
duty to review aid programs. A preliminary examination must be 
carried out within two months, and the Commission must then decide 
whether or not to invoke the contentious procedure of Article 93(2). 
Article 93 authorizes the Commission to require that aid programs not 
compatible with the common market be altered or abolished. It imposes 
on Member States the obligation to inform the Commission, in advance 
of implementation, of plans to grant or alter aid. Failure to notify 
the Commission may result in proceedings being brought by the 
Commission against the member state concerned. Aid granted contrary 
to these rules may have to be repaid by the recipient. If a member 
state fails to comply with a Commission decision requiring alteration
5. See, for example, E. C. Commission, First Report on Competition 




























































































or abolition of aid, the Commission or any interested member state may 
refer the matter to the European Court.5
Commission decisions under Article 92 may also be challenged 
before the European Court by the member state concerned, the recipient 
or intended recipient of the aid involved and, in certain 
circumstances, by competitors of the latter. During such proceedings 
the European Court is concerned solely with questions of legality and 
procedural correctness. The Court has explicitly questioned the 
Commission's exercise of the discretion granted it by Article 92(3) 
only in extreme cases.7
However, the Court may intervene on the ground of procedural 
illegality, such as failure of the Commission to give adequate reasons 
for its decisions (as required by Article 190 of the Treaty). In 
practice, the effect of a requirement of adequate reasoning may not be 
greatly different from a review of the grounds for a decision.
Article 92 is not in itself directly applicable: it cannot be
enforced in the national courts of member states. This means that the 
European Court has limited opportunities to deliver preliminary
6. Article 93 also provides a procedure under which a Member State 
may appeal to the Council of Ministers for a declaration that an aid 
program is compatible with the common market. Such decisions may only 
be made on grounds of exceptional circumstances, and the procedure 
appears to have fallen into disuse. An alternative mechanism may, in 
practice, be available via the preparation of a directive under
Article 92(3)(d). See the E. C. Commission. Sixth Report on 
Competition Policy. Brussels, 1977, p. 112.
7. See Case 730/79 Philip Morris Holland BV v. E. C. Commission 
(1980) ECR 2671 (1981) 2 CMLR 321, to be discussed below. See also 
Advocate General Darmon in Case 248/84 Federal Republic of Germany




























































































rulings interpreting this provision for national courts. There is an 
indirect avenue for such interpretations: an interpretation of
Article 92 may be necessary to determine whether there has been a 
breach of the Article 93(3) duty of prior notification, which is 
directly applicable.8
To the extent that opportunities for judicial intervention in 
this field are limited, the Commission enjoys the freedom to direct 
the development of state aid policy. A consequence of the fact that 
private enforcement of Article 92 before national courts is largely 
excluded is that the workload of the Commission is increased.
III. The Definition of State Aid
The first policy issue that arises in the application of Article 
92 is the definition of state aid. State aid has been found in the 
presence of
(a) interventions which, in various forms, mitigate the charges 
which are normally included in the budget of an undertaking and 
which without being subsidies are similar in character and have 
the same effect;9
(b) the payment of a proportion of the costs of production by 
someone other than the purchasers;10
8. Case 74/76 Ianelli & Volpi SpA v. Pitta Paolo Meroni (1977)
ECR 557 (1977) 2 CMLR 688.
9. Case 30/59 De Gezamenlijke Steenkolenmijnen in Limburg v.
ECSC High Authority (1961) ECR1 at 19.
10. Opinion of Advocate General Lagrange, Case 30/59 De Gezamenlijke 





























































































(c) an advantage entailing a burden to public finances in the 
form either of expenditure or of reduced revenue;11
(d) a grant from the State for no consideration;12
(e) assumption by the state of costs which normally fall on 
undertakings;13
(f) assumption by the state of part of the risk which is 
normally assumed by undertakings-,14
(g) compensation from the state to a company or receipt of 
reduced revenue by the state;15
(h) the grant of resources or advantages by the state to 
encourage the attainment of economic or social objectives;16 *
The result often appears to be much the same whether the
definition applied takes as its starting-point the effects for the
recipient or the effects for the state; assistance provided by the
state in a variety of forms is covered by Article 92.
11. Opinion of Advocate Genera] Capotorti in Case 82/77 Openbaar 
Ministerie (Public Prosecutor) v. Jacobus Philippus Van Tiggele 
(1978) ECR 25 at 52 (1978) 2 CMLR 528, at 545.
12. Opinion of Advocate General Reischel in Case 61/79 
Amministrazione delie Finanze Dello Stato v. Denkavit Italiana Srl 
(1980) ECR 1205 at 1235 (1981) 3 CMLR 694 at 702.
13. Advocate General Darmon in Case 248/84 Germany v. E. C.
Commission (1987) ECR 4013 at 4027 (1988) 1 CMLR 591 at 596.
14. Commission Decision 90/70 of 28 June 1989 concerning aid provided 
by France to certain primary processing steel undertakings 0J 1990 L 
47/28 at 35.
15. Commission Decision 82/73 of 15 December 1981 on the preferential 
tariff charged to glasshouse growers for natural gas in the 
Netherlands OJ 1982 L 37/29 at 33.
16. Case 61/79 Amministrazione delle Finanze Dello Stato v.





























































































Most obvious is a direct payment of funds. Even if assistance 
does not come directly from public funds, it becomes a state aid if 
"paid for through levies that are obligatory as a result of government 
action."17 For regulated firms, a price increase may constitute 
a state aid if consumers are reimbursed for purchases under a social 
security system.18 *
A preferential tariff fixed by a public authority for a 
particular customer or class of customer can constitute state aid, if 
it results in the state receiving less revenue.13 A state loan 
or exchange rate guarantee constitutes aid, whether or not the state 
later has to make up a loss, since it allows favored firms to benefit 
from a reduced rate of interest.20
17. Commission Decision 89/296 of 30 March 1989 ruling on a financial 
measure taken by the Federal Republic of Germany in respect of the
coal industry during 1988 and a supplementary financial measure in 
respect of the coal industry during 1987. OJ 1989 L 116/52 at 52.
18. E. C. Commission, Sixteenth Report on Competition Policy.
Brussels, 1987, p. 151.
19. Commission Decision 82/73 of 15 December 1981 on the preferential 
tariff charged to glasshouse growers for natural gas in the 
Netherlands OJ 1982 L 37/29 at 33. This decision was upheld by the 
European Court in Case 213/85 E. C. Commission v. Kingdom of the 
Netherlands (1988) 2 CMLR 287 and Joined Cases 67, 68, & 70/85 
Kuckerij Gebroeders van der Kooy BV, Johannes Wllhelmus van Vliet, 
Laridbouwschap and Kingdom of Belgium v. E. C. Commission (1989)
2 CMLR 804. However, a rebate which merely reflects cost savings does 
not constitute a state aid; Case 169/84 Compagnie Française de l'azote
(COFAZ) S.A. v. E. C. Commission (1986) ECR 391 (1986) 3 CMLR 385.
20. Commission Decision 79/519 of 18 May 1979 concerning the 'special 
financing scheme for investments to increase exporting firms' 




























































































Problems may arise in distinguishing the grant of state aid from
the operation of ordinary fiscal measures, social security measures,
infrastructure improvements, and so on. Here the guiding principle is21
Article 92 does not distinguish between the measures of State 
intervention concerned by reference to their causes or 
aims but defines them in relation to their effects.
This rule comes from a judgment22 in which the European 
Court held that aid is present where a particular industrial sector is 
exempted from the application of a general social security system, 
without there being any justification for the exemption in the nature 
or general scheme of the system. The Court confirmed the Commission’s 
view that such exemption constituted an aid incompatible with the 
common market.
The issue has also sometimes appeared as one of determining the 
relations between state powers and Community powers. For example, 
monetary policy remains the province of member states. They may not, 
however, employ their authority in this area so as to provide 
preferential interest rates which amount to state aid.23
21. Case 173/73 Re Aids to the Textile Industry: Italy v.
E. C. Commission (1974) ECR 709 at 718 (1974) 2 CMLR 593 at 
606.
22. Op. cit. For another case involving the distinction between 
fiscal policy and state aid, see Commission Decision 90/197 of 4 
October 1989 on an aid granted in France to cereal farmers and 
producers, financed by reimbursement of specific fiscal and parafiscal 
changes OJ 1990 L 105/15.
23. Cases 6/69 & 11/69 Re Export Credits.- E. C. Commission v. 




























































































There may also be difficulties in distinguishing state aid from
state investment. Here the Commission's position is24
...provisions of new capital to firms by governments are in
the nature of aid ...where a private investor in a market economy
would not have provided the financing in similar circumstances.
If the state provides capital In amounts and on terms that a firm
could not obtain on the open market, state aid is present.
IV. Distortion of Competition and Effect on Trade
Where state aid is identified on anything other than a purely
negligible scale, competition within the common market will inevitably
be different from what it would have been if left to market forces.
Nonetheless, Article 92(1) requires that at least the likelihood of a
distortion of competition capable of affecting trade between member
states be established. Effects on competition must also be examined
to determine whether aid otherwise entitled to an exception under
Article 92(3)(c) must be prohibited because of its effect on trading
conditions.
A 1970 judgment involving a French subsidy scheme established 
that Article 92 requires only a qualitative evaluation of the effect 
of an aid scheme on competition.25 The aid scheme in question 
was designed to secure the reorganization of the French textile 
industry. It involved the imposition of a tax on all sales of textile 
goods in France, whether the goods were of domestic or foreign origin.
24. Commission Decision 87/418 of 4 February 1987 concerning aid to a 
Belgian steel pipe and tube manufacturer OJ 1987 L 227/45 at 47. See 
Case 323/84 Intermills SA v. E. C. Commission (1984) ECR 3809 (1986)
1 CMLR 614.
25. Case 47/69 Re aids to the textile industry: France v.




























































































Proceeds from the tax were distributed to a research institute and to 
a trade association, to finance its industry reorganization program.
While the Commission did not object to the goals of this aid, it 
objected to the fact that foreign producers were taxed to provide a 
benefit that went mainly to French firms. In 1968 the Commission 
issued a decision requiring France either to abolish the program or 
alter the way it was funded. France challenged this decision before 
the European Court.
Among several arguments, one involved the relatively small size 
of the tax. The Advocate General's discussion outlines the terms of 
the debate:26
As for the level of tax, whose rate, initially fixed at 0.20 per 
cent, now stands at 0.44 per cent....the French government is of 
course right to assert that such low rates could lead only to a 
small increase in prices... However, it could well be asked 
whether the situation should really be assessed in such 
quantitative terms. No doubt the French and Italian versions 
of Article 92 lend some support to this assessment, since they 
use the terms 'dans une mesure contraire à l'intérêt 
commun and 'in misura contraria al comune interesse', i.e., 'to a 
degree contrary to the common interest.' The German and Dutch 
versions of the Article use words showing that the criterion 
is a qualitative one, since they state that the measures of aid 
should not disturb trading conditions in a 'manner' (in einer 
Weise', 'zodanig'j contrary to the common interest.
This view limits the extent of the inquiry into the distorting
effects of state aid required of the Commission;27
26. Case 47/69 (1970) ECR 487 at 501: (1970) CMLR 351 at 358- 
359.




























































































If we consider the matter from a qualitative point of view 
...there is no doubt...that imposing handicaps on foreign 
producers to the detriment of their competitive position, 
especially as a result of tax measures taken within the framework 
of a system of aid, would constitute such a disturbance (in 
trading conditions]. The extent to which such negative effects 
are translated into reality is therefore irrelevant.
In its judgment, the Court confirmed that aid which did not
disturb trade between member states would not be prohibited28
A system of aid may be contrary to Community rules and yet be 
acceptable, because it does not substantially disturb trade 
between States; nevertheless its disturbing effect may be 
aggravated by a method of financing which would render the system 
as a whole incompatible with a single market and the common 
interest.
but also indicated that the rate of tax was not the essential element
in finding a distortion of competition;29
[The Commission] has therefore rightly decided that this aid, 
whatever might be the rate of tax, had the effect, because of its 
method of financing, of disturbing trade to a degree contrary to 
the common interest, within the meaning of Article 92(3)(c).
The de minimus rule retains relevance. The aid must be of
sufficient scale to have a real rather than a purely theoretical
effect on the market.30 But that effect is to be evaluated in
qualitative rather than quantitative terms.
28. Case 47/69 (1970) ECR 487 at 495; (1970) CMLR 351 at 363. See
also the Opinion of Advocate General Reisch! in Case 40/75 Société des Produits 
Bertrand S.A. v. E. C. Commission (1976) ECR 1 (1976) 1 CMLR 220, for a 
similar argument.
29. Case 47/69 (1970) ECR 487 at 496; (1970) CMLR 351 at 364.
30. See, for example, the Opinion of Advocate General Reischl in Case 
40/75 Société des Produits Bertrand S.A. v. E. C. Commission (1976)




























































































Re aids to the textile industry: Ita ly v. E. C. Commission31
illustrates what is required to establish that there is an effect on 
competition of the kind prohibited by Article 92(1). An Italian law 
passed on 1 December 1971, among other things, reduced social security 
charges of firms in the textile and garment-making industry from 15 
per cent to 10 per cent of family allowances, for a period of three 
years. The resulting savings for the industry were estimated to be 
about 0.8 per cent of sales. Due to administrative delays, this 
reduction came into effect as of June 30, 1973. In July 1973, the 
Commission issued a decision requiring Italy to eliminate the special 
reduction in family charges. Ita ly challenged this decision before 
the European Court.
One of the Italian arguments for dismissal was that the 
Commission had failed to establish that the reduction in social 
charges affected trade between member states and distorted or 
threatened to distort competition. Here the Advocate General 
maintained32
One is here in a field where the difficulties of positive proof 
must often be insurmountable. Once it is clear that the natural 
consequence of the grant of an aid to an industry in a member- 
state must be to increase that industry's competitiveness v is -à - 
vis its competitors in other member States the inference can... 
properly be drawn that the aid does (or would if introduced) 
distort competition and affect trade between member-States.
By definition and the express wording of Article 92(1) (which
covers only aid favoring certain undertakings or the production of
31. Case 173/73 (1974) ECR 709 (1974) 2 CMLR 593.




























































































certain goods) aid increases the competitiveness of the recipient.
The position being urged is therefore very nearly a "per se" rule: if 
aid is granted, the conclusion that the aid distorts competition is 
almost automatic:33 34
The Italian textile industry is in competition with textile 
undertakings in the other member-States, as is shown by the 
substantial and growing volume of Italian textile exports to 
other member-States of the Common Market. The modification of 
production costs in the Italian textile industry by the reduction 
of the social charges in question necessarily affects trade 
between the member-States.
Philip Morris Holland BV v. E. C. Commission.3"1 a decision 
concerning a Dutch investment subsidy program, also makes clear that 
EC policy on state aid does not require complicated market analysis.
The Netherlands Act of 29 June 1978 provided for sufficiently large 
investment projects to receive subsidies up to a maximum of 4 per cent 
of the value of the investment. The exact amount of aid was to depend 
on the number of jobs created. Section 6 of the Act provided that the 
aid would not be granted if the Commission found it to be incompatible 
with the Common Market under Articles 92 to 94 of the Treaty. The 
Commission approved this scheme as a general system of aid, subject to 
prior notification of individual grants.
One such grant involved a project of Philip Morris International 
to close a cigarette factory at one location in the Netherlands, while 
expanding capacity at another (for a net increase of capacity of 
11,100 million to 16,000 million cigarettes per year). The implied 
change in employment was either 5 (according to the Commission) or 475 
(according to Philip Morris Holland).
33. Case 173/73 (1974) ECR 709 at 721 (1974) 2 CMLR 593, at 608.




























































































At this time, there was substantial Community trade in 
cigarettes. The Netherlands was one of the largest importers and 
exporters of cigarettes. Philip Morris, the second-largest group of 
tobacco manufacturers in the world, expected the investment program to 
give it half of Dutch manufacturing of cigarettes, and expected to 
export more than 80 per cent of its production in the Netherlands to 
other member states. Based on this information, the Commission 
concluded that35
The Netherlands Government's proposed aid is likely, therefore, 
to affect trade and distort competition between Member States by 
favouring the undertaking within the meaning of Article 92 Cl) of 
the EEC Treaty.
After declining to find the aid qualified for one of the 
exemptions provided for in Article 92(3) (we discuss this aspect of 
the decision below), the Commission ordered the Netherlands to refrain 
from granting the aid. Philip Morris challenged this ruling before 
the European Court on several grounds. One was that the Commission's 
economic analysis was not sufficient to justify a finding of 
distortion to competition:36
...that, in order to decide to what extent specific aid is 
incompatible with the Common Market, it is appropriate to apply 
first of all the criteria for deciding whether there are any 
restrictions on competition under Articles 85 and 86 of the 
Treaty. The Commission must therefore first determine the 
'relevant market' and in order to do so must take account of the 
product, the territory and the period of time in question. It 
must then consider the pattern of the market in question in order 
to be able to assess how far the aid in question in a given case 
affects relations between competitors.
35. Commission Decision 79/743 of 27 July 1979 on proposed 
Netherlands Government assistance to increase the production capacity 
of a cigarette manufacturer OJ 1979 L 217/17 at 18.
36. (1980) ECR 2671 at 2688 (1981) 2 CMLR 321 at 339. A point In 
this Judgement was that Philip Morris had to the right to bring an 
action against a decision of the Commission addressed to a member 




























































































Philip Morris Holland wanted the Commission decision to be set 
aside, because it did not contain the described analysis. The Court 
said simply37
...the aid which the Dutch Government proposed to grant was for 
an undertaking organised for international trade ... The aid in 
question was to help to enlarge its production capacity and 
consequently to increase its capacity to maintain the flow of 
trade including that between member States. On the other hand 
the aid is said to have reduced the cost of converting the 
production facilities and has thereby given the applicant a 
competitive advantage over manufacturers who have completed or 
intend to complete at their own expense a similar increase in the 
production capacity of their plant.
The Court considered that these facts justified the Commission's
decision that aid would threaten to distort competition. As to the
effect of the aid on trade between Member States, we again find what
seems to be a per se rule:38
When state financial aid strengthens the position of an 
undertaking compared with other undertakings competing in intra- 
Community trade the latter must be regarded as affected by that 
aid.
However, all state aid will strengthen an undertaking, compared 
to undertakings that do not receive equivalent aid. Taken at face 
value, therefore, the Court's position means all state aid to 
enterprises that compete in intra-Community trade affects that trade 
in the sense required to apply Article 92 of the Treaty. This is very 
much consistent with the indication in France v. Commission that it is





























































































a qualitative rather than a quantitative evaluation of the effect of 
state aid that is required of the Commission.
While the analytical requirements imposed on the Commission as 
regards state aid are relatively mild, the Commission must state its 
reasons clearly. This is clear from several judgments of the European 
Court. One such case39 concerned the proposed equity participation 
of a Dutch regional development authority in the spinoff of 
Leeuwarder, a paperboard processing firm, from a parent firm that had 
been in persistent financial difficulties.
A 1982 Commission decision found the proposed purchase of shares 
to constitute a state aid, and declared it incompatible with the 
common market. This decision was challenged, on several grounds, by 
Leeuwarder and by the Dutch Government. Among other things, they 
argued40
...that the Commission, contrary to Article 190 of the Treaty, 
failed to give a sufficient statement of its reasons for adopting 
the decision with regard both to the conditions laid down in 
Article 92(1) and to the refusal to apply article 92(3).
The Court began by stating the established principle41
...that the statement of reasons for a decision adversely 
affecting an undertaking must be such as to allow the Court to 
review its legality and to provide the undertaking concerned with 
the information necessary to enable it to ascertain whether or 
not the decision is well-founded.
39. Joined Cases 296 and 318/82 Kingdom of the Netherlands and 
Leeuwarder Paplerwarenfabriek BV v. E. C. Commission (1985) ECR 809
(1985) 3 CMLR 380.
40. (1985) ECR 809 at 822 (1985) 3 CMLR 380 at 394.




























































































Applying this principle to the Leeuwarder decision, the Court 
concluded42
Even if in certain cases the very circumstances in which the aid 
is granted are sufficient to show that the aid is capable of 
affecting trade between Member States and of distorting or 
threatening to distort competition, the Commission must at least 
set out those circumstances in the statement of reasons for its 
decision. In this case it has failed to do so since the 
contested decision does not contain the slightest information 
concerning the situation of the relevant market, the place of 
Leeuwarder in that market, the pattern of trade between Member 
States in the products in question or the undertaking's exports.
On this and other grounds the Court voided the Commission’s
decision. Even though the Commission need not conduct a detailed
analysis of the impact of an aid measure on competition, it must
explain the analysis it does make.
In this same spirit, in another instance43 the Court
annulled a Commission decision partly on the ground that the
Commission gave no concrete indication of the way in which competition
was damaged and partly because the Commission had not explained why
the activities of the aided company would have such an adverse effect
on trading conditions that its disappearance would have been
preferable to its rescue.
Advocate General Slynn took a similar view in another case:44
42. (1985) ECR 809 at 824 (1985) 3 CMLR 380 at 396-397.
43. Case 323/84 Intermills SA v. E. C. Commission (1984)
ECR 3809 (1986) 1 CMLR 614.
44. Case 223/85 Rljn-Schelde-Verolme (RSV) Machinefabrleken en 
Scheepswerven NV v. E. C. Commission (1987) ECR 4617 at 4648-
4649 (1989) 2 CMLR 259 at 270-271. As the Court reversed the 




























































































...I am of the opinion that the contested decision does not 
satisfy the requirements of Article 190 as interpreted by the 
Court in respect of the two related issues of the aid's effect on 
trade and competition and its compatibility with the common 
market. In the first place it contains practically nothing on 
the relevant market or RSV’s share of that market... Secondly, 
the Commission says nothing to substantiate the assertions in the 
decision that the relevant market was suffering from 
overcapacity. ...the Commission does not explain why it felt 
able to approve the aid notified in December 1980...but did not 
feel able to approve the 1982 arrangements which were, so far as 
the Commission was aware, designed to cover unanticipated further 
costs of the same operation. There may be good reasons for this, 
but if there are they should be spelled out.
Such rulings have clearly had an effect on Commission practice.
Its  decisions now routinely contain market and trade statistics that
serve to support conclusions concerning the impact of aid on
competition and on trade among member states.
V. The Principle of Compensatory Justification
The idea runs throughout the Treaty that distortions or even
restrictions of competition may be permitted, provided that they are
necessary to secure objectives compatible with Community values other
than maximization of competition. Article 85(3) permits exemption of
certain restrictive agreements from the prohibition of Article 85(1).
Article 90(2) permits certain relaxations of such prohibitions in the
case of public undertakings entrusted with tasks of public interest.-15
The Philip Morris'45 6 * case allowed the Court to endorse a similar
principle in the context of Commission practice concerning state aid.
45. The same Idea underlies the case law of the European Court, which 
recognizes that certain exceptions from basic Treaty prohibitions,
other than those expressly laid down in the Treaty, may be permitted 
on the basis of 'mandatory requirements.'
46. Case 730/79 Philip Morris Holland BV v. E. C. Commission




























































































The principle of compensatory Justification holds that the grant of
aid falling within Article 92(1) will be permitted only when necessary
to accomplish one of the goals of Article 92(3). As stated by the
Commission in the Tenth General Report on Competition Policy:47
Exemptions to incompatibility included in Article 92(3) must 
be strictly  Interpreted, notably, aid may only be granted when 
the Commission can establish that it will contribute to the 
attainment of the objectives specified in the exemption which, 
under normal market conditions, the recipient firms would not 
attain by their own actions.
and elsewhere48 *
To grant an exemption where there is no compensatory 
justification would be tantamount to allowing trade between 
Member States to be affected and competition to be distorted 
without any benefit in terms of the interest of the Community, 
while at the same time accepting that undue advantages accrue 
to some Member States.
State aid that distorts competition will be permitted only to 
accomplish Community goals and only in the presence of market failure. 
If market forces would accomplish the goal without state aid, and 
state aid will distort competition, then state aid will not be 
permitted.
In Philip Morris, the applicants argued that the Commission's 
role should be much more limited than implied by the principle of 
compensatory justification. Philip Morris objected to the 
Commission's position that state aid should be approved only if the
47. Commission Decision 79/743 of 27 July 1979 on proposed 
Netherlands Government assistance to increase the production capacity 
of a cigarette manufacturer 0J 1979 L 217/17 at 18: E. C, Commission 
Tenth Report on Competition Policy, Brussels, 1981, p. 149.
48. Decision 81/626 of 10 July 1981 0J 1981 L 229/12 at 13; the same




























































































market, unaided, would not produce the desired effect. It  urged the 
Court to interpret the Treaty as requiring approval of state aids that 
fell within the categories outlined in Article 92(3), without regard 
to the ability of the market to achieve the desired goal.
This position was rejected by the Court.49 As later summarized 
by the Commission,50
State aids are in principle incompatible with the common market. 
The discretionary power of the Commission should only be 
exercised when the aids proposed by Member States contribute to 
the achievement of the Community objectives and interest set out 
in Article 92(3) EEC. The national interest of a Member State or 
the benefits obtained by the recipient of aid in contributing to 
the national interest do not by themselves Justify the positive 
exercise of the Commission's discretionary powers.
The principle of compensatory justification requires an analysis
of the situation in each case. A result is that aid granted under
general schemes for an entire sector or branch of an industry is
acceptable only on condition that significant individual grants are
notified to the Commission:51
It is now the well-established policy of the Commission to accept 
such general aid schemes subject to one of two conditions, namely 
that the Member State concerned informs the Commission of either 
a regional or sectoral plan of application, or where this is felt 
not to be possible, that it notifies significant individual cases 
of application.
Subject to this condition, particular applications of general aid 
schemes are evaluated according to the same standards as specific aid 
sc hemes.
49. Case 730/79 Philip Morris Holland BV v. E. C. Commission 
(1980) ECR 2671 (1981) 2 CMLR 321.
50. E. C. Commission, Tenth Report on Competition Policy.
Brussels, 1980, p. 151.





























































































Acceptable justifications for state aid may be categorized by
reference to Community policies, which may require what would
otherwise be unacceptable distortions of competition:52
...in authorising derogations from the prohibition of State aid 
the Commission must strive to co-ordinate national policies 
toward aids on the basis of common criteria and in terms of the 
general interests of the Community.
Policy requirements, like those of sub-paragraphs, often overlap.
It would be unrealistic to expect that each policy can be neatly 
matched with a particular sub-paragraph within Article 92(3). Order 
emerges only when the application of policy to disorderly reality is 
examined.
A. Sectoral Policies
The approaches of the Commission to sectoral aid are basically of 
two kinds. First, such problems may be approached within the 
framework of a common policy for which the Treaties provide a specific 
legal basis (such as those for coal and steel, agriculture and 
fisheries). Here the approach of the Commission to the grant of state 
aid has been determined by the general requirements of each policy.
For example,53 *
...Quite important Commission positions on agriculture or 
transport will not be considered here, since they cannot be 
separated from the context of the common policies specific to 
these sectors and within which the purpose aimed at can be more 
clearly understood.
52. Opinion of Advocate Cenerai Capotorti in Case 730/79 Philip 
Morris Holland BV v. E. C. Commission (1980) ECR 2671 at 2702 
(1981) 2 CMLR 321 at 335.
53. E. C. Commission. First Report on Competition Policy.




























































































Binding rules have been enacted regarding aid to the coal and 
steel industries, the agricultural and fishing industries, transport 
by rail, road, inland waterway and sea.5,1
The second approach constitutes the response of the Commission to 
state interventions in specific sectors. Here the principal concern 
of the Commission has been to prevent the grant of state aid from 
exacerbating existing problems or transferring them from one member 
state to another. Principles have been formulated regarding aid to 
the textile, man-made fibre, and automobile industries, as well as air 
transport.55 These principles are not legally binding.56
The general policy of the Commission regarding sectoral aid was 
defined in a communication to the Council of 25 May 1978.57 At
54. Rules governing aid to the steel industry are contained in 
Decision 3484/85 OJ 1985 L 340/1, and rules on aid to the coal 
Industry in Decision 2064/86 OJ 1986 L 177/1. Regulation 1107/70 JO 
1970 L 130/1 governs aid to rail, road and inland waterway transport. 
Regulation 797/85 OJ 1985 L 93/1 governs aid for Improving the 
efficiency of agricultural structures, and Regulation 355/77 OJ 1977 L 
51/1 governs common measures to improve the conditions under which 
agricultural products are processed and marketed. Regulation 101/76
OJ 1976 L 10/19 deals with state aid in the fisheries sector.
55. The Commission first notified member states of principles
regarding aids to the textile industry in 1971, and these were updated 
in 1977. Guidelines to aid the automobile sector, requiring prior 
notification and annual reports, were introduced in 1988. C0M(84) 72
governs air transport.
56. See the view of Advocate General Darmon in Case 310/85 Deufil 
GmbH & Co. KG v. E. C. Commission (1987) ECR 901 at 914 
(1988) 1 CMLR 553 at 556. This Is In contrast to the binding 
directives on shipbuilding; see Directive 87/167 OJ 1987 L 69/55, 





























































































this time, sectoral policy was seen as a tool to ease industries with 
persistent excess capacity through a transitional period:58
(i) aids should not be given where their sole effect would be to 
maintain the status quo...;
(ii) ...while rescue measures may be needed in order to provide a 
breathing space during which longer-term solutions to a company's 
difficulties can be worked out, they should not frustrate any 
necessary reductions in capacity...;
(iii) since It is a common feature of the industries concerned 
that capacity is excessive, aids should not be given to 
investment projects which would result in capacity being 
increased. ...
Operating Aid
Operating aid is assistance that "has a direct effect on 
production costs and on the selling price."59 It is regarded as 
artificially maintaining excess capacity, and has traditionally been 
considered particularly objectionable. Such aid, it is feared, may 
discourage firms from undertaking the restructuring activity necessary 
to solve their problems. Operating aid is opposed even if the result 
is closure of the prospective recipient:60
58. E. C. Commission, Eighth Report on Competition Policy.
Brussels, 1978, p. 126. Similar language appears in innumerable 
Commission decisions.
59. Commission Decision 82/744 of 11 October 1982 concerning Italian 
national Law No 423/81 of 1 August 1981 on measures for agriculture 
OJ 1982 L 315/23 at 24.
60. Commission Decision 88/174 of 17 November 1987 concerning aid 
which the Land of Baden-Württemberg of the Federal Republic of Germany 
has provided to BUG-Alutechnik GmbH, an undertaking producing semi­




























































































...through the grant of DM 2 million the Land prevented economic 
market forces from having their normal consequences - the 
disappearance of a loss-making uncompetitive undertaking - kept 
the undertaking in business artificially and facilitated its 
take-over by a large integrated aluminum group. This aid is 
therefore of a rescue nature and favours the recipient 
undertaking and its purchaser compared with other undertakings 
competing in the sector, by an artificial improvement of its 
profitability.
Recently, however, the Commission has indicated a willingness to 
abandon its traditional hostility toward operating aid, in the context 
of regional aid programs directed toward the most depressed areas of 
the Community.61 This development is discussed below.
Restructuring Aid
Aid designed to resolve structural problems is more likely to be
found acceptable than aid aimed at cyclical or conjunctural problems62 *
As to the exception in Article 92 (3 )(c ) for aid to facilitate 
the development of certain economic activities or certain 
economic areas, Noviboch produces and markets quality ceramic 
sanitary ware on a fairly modest scale, with 269 employees.
...its output is currently 20 to 30 7. lower than that of its 
predecessor...
The restructuring stemming from the winding-up of Boch has 
therefore contributed to the reorganization of a Community 
industry suffering from surplus production capacity...
...the aid in the form of a subscription of Bfrs 400 million of 
share capital granted in connection with the setting-up of 
Noviboch therefore qualifies for exemption under Article 92(3)(c).
The amount and intensity of aid must be justified by the restructuring
effort involved, taking account of general structural problems of the
61. OJ 1988 C 212/2.
62. Commission Decision 87/423 of 11 March 1987 concerning aid which
the Belgian Government has granted to a ceramic sanitary ware 




























































































region where the investment is to take place.63
As noted above, one of the grounds for appeal in the Leeuwarder
case was the claim that the Commission had inadequately explained its
unwillingness to find the Dutch investment compatible with the common
market, as provided in Article 92(3). The Court agreed:64
...the statement of reasons with regard to the failure to apply 
the exemptions provided for in Article 92 (3) is inadequate. In 
that respect, it is declared in the statement of reasons for the 
decision that it had not been established that the conditions for 
the application of any of the exemptions were satisfied...
Although that statement Is conclusively supported with regard to 
the exemptions provided for in Article 92 (3) (a) and (b)..., 
that is not the position with regard to the exemption provided 
for in subparagraph (c) thereof, in respect of which the 
statement of reasons for the decision does not indicate that the 
Commission considered all the essential elements of fact or law 
which could have justified the granting of that exemption.
The following paragraph of the Court's decision outlines the
facts taken into account by the Commission, and the additional facts
which, in the Court's view, the Commission should have taken into
account (emphasis added):65
63. Commission Decision No. 2320/81 of 7 August 1981 establishing 
Community rules for aids to the steel industry 0J 1981 L 228/14 at 16.
64. Joined Cases 296 and 318/82 Kingdom of the Netherlands and 
Leeuwarder Papierwarenfabriek BV v. E. C. Commission (1985)





























































































The contested decision merely states in the first place that the 
Netherlands aid 'would not "facilitate the development of ... 
certain economic areas" within the meaning of that provision'... 
and in the second place that 'developments in the paperboard­
processing industry show that to maintain production capacity 
through the grant of State aid would not be in the common 
interest' and that 'furthermore, the paperboard-processing 
industry's future prospects rule out the conclusion that the aid 
envisaged would not adversely affect trading conditions to the 
extent contrary to the common interest'...However, there is 
no indication whatsoever in the decision that the Commission 
took into consideration the essential fact, which might have 
caused it to make a different assessment, that the aid in 
question was accompanied by a restructuring of the recipient 
undertaking which, by diverting its production to high- 
quality products, led to a reduction in its production 
capacity and in its market share.
The Court's comments at this point indicate the importance of a 
linkage between aid and restructuring for the possibility of exemption 
under Article 92(3)(c).
Rescue Aid
In a letter to the Member States of 24 January 1979,66 * the 
Commission elaborated on the conditions under which rescue aid would 
be regarded as compatible with the common market. Rescue aid must be 
designed to keep a firm in business while the causes of its 
difficulties are discovered and a remedy is worked out. Compatible 
rescue aid will have the following characteristics:
(1) it is provided in cash and must bear normal interest rates:
(2) it is provided only for the time needed to draw up recovery 
measures (generally six months or less):
(3) it does not have adverse effects on industrial activity  on 
other Member States:
(4 ) it Is notified to the Commission In advance.
66. For discussion, see Commission Decision 87/585 of 15 July 1987 on
aid granted by the French Government to a producer of textiles,




























































































The judgment in Intermills S.A. v. E. C. Commission.67 which
involved a Belgian program of aid to a paper manufacturing firm, is 
illustrative of the issues raised by rescue aid.
Intermills SA operated five factories in Wallonia. State aid was 
linked to a restructuring program that included a reduction in output, 
conversion from mass production to high valued-added specialty papers, 
closure of two factories, and creation of three independent companies 
to manage the remaining factories. The aid took the form of 
investment by the Walloon Regional Executive in Intermills and in the 
three manufacturing companies, and a low-interest loan to finance an 
investment program by the manufacturing companies.
The Commission's decision emphasized the requirement of 
compensatory justification:68
...the Commission must be satisfied that there is a specific 
compensatory justification forthcoming from the particular 
recipient: the grant of aid must be required to promote the 
attainment of one of the objectives set out in Article 92(3). 
Where this cannot be shown, it is clear that the aid does not 
contribute to the attainment of the objectives specified in the 
exemption clauses but serves to increase the financial strength 
of the undertaking in question.
In this instance, the Commission found a Justification for 
certain aid, based on Article 92(3)(c):69
67. Case 323/82 (1984) ECR 3809 (1986) 1 CMLR 614.
68. Commission Decision 82/670 of 22 July 1982 OJ 1982 L 280/30, 





























































































...the Community's paper industry has in the past had to face 
strong competition from manufacturers in non-Community countries 
producing under particularly favourable natural conditions. This 
competition threatens to grow in the near future...
It is in the Community interest that the paper industry 
should adapt to the new situation in particular by reducing the 
share of bulk-production paper in its output and converting to 
special papers.
The Commission, however, distinguished between aid in the form of
low-interest loans and aid in the form of capital investment. In the
Commission's view, low-interest loans were directly related to the
conversion toward specialty paper, and hence justified under Article
92(3)(c). Capital investment, however (2,350 million Belgian francs
In an enterprise whose capital and reserves were 1,250 million Bfrs)
was intended mainly to allow the firm to meet its debt-servicing
obligations. The Commission was not willing to permit this "rescue
aid," and ordered that it be stopped.
Intermills SA applied to the European Court to  set aside the
Commission Decision. It argued, among other things, that the
Commission had not adequately explained why it was appropriate to :
distinguish aid In the form of low-interest loans and aid in the form
of capital investment. The Court agreed:70
...the settlement of an undertaking's existing debts in order to 
ensure its survival does not necessarily adversely affect trading 
conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest, as 
provided in Article 92(3), where such an operation is, for 
example, accompanied by a restructuring plan. In this case, the 
Commission has not shown why the applicant's activities on the 
market, following the conversion of its production with the 
assistance of the aid granted, were likely to have such an 
adverse effect on trading conditions that the undertaking's 
disappearance would have been preferable to its rescue.
On this ground, the Court voided the Commission's decision.




























































































Conditions in the relevant industry or market determine whether 
or not sectoral aid is permissible. It follows that developments in 
such conditions are capable of affecting the treatment of state aid 
under Article 92. For example, in 1973 the United Kingdom notified 
the Commission of its intention to assist the offshore supplies 
industry by making interest relief grants. The Commission did not 
object to the scheme at that time, because it was designed to promote 
development of new technology in a field where there was little or not 
intra-Community trade.71 By 1976, however, sales on the United 
Kingdom market had increased to such an extent that the Commission 
felt that the aid threatened to distort competition. Moreover, the 
Community offshore supplies industry had developed to such an extent 
that no exception could be made under Article 92(3)(c).72
A 1987 decision delineates the narrow range within which Article 
92(3)(b) may be found to justify rescue aid:73
71. Commission Decision 7 9 /496  of 2 May 1979 on the United Kingdom
scheme of assistance in the form of interest relief grants in favour 
of the offshore supplies industry (offshore supplies interest relief 
grant, OSIRG) OJ 1979 L 127/50.
72. Ibid.
73. Commission Decision 88/167 of 7 October 1987 concerning Law 
1386/1983 by which the Greek Government grants aid to Greek Industry 




























































































In the terms of Article 92(3](b) aid, in order that it may be 
considered compatible with the common market, must be in the 
nature of a remedy for the perceived serious disturbance in the 
economy of the Member State concerned. Since ...it will then be 
a matter of granting aid to companies which, although basically 
viable, have run into difficulties threatening their survival, it 
follows that the operation must not result in their being left in 
a stronger competitive position vis-a-v is  industries in 
other Member States than would otherwise occur had those 
difficulties not arisen in the first place. Accordingly the aid 
must not promote expansion of production capacity nor must it 
merely shift the problem without finding a genuine solution to 
the social and industrial problems facing the Community as a 
whole or even aggravate the situation still further in the medium 
or long-term future.
Article 92(3)(b] permits rescue aid, provided the aid actually helps 
find a solution to the underlying problem, rather than making it 
worse, postponing solution, or shifting it elsewhere in the Community.
B. Regional Policy74
The Commission's practice regarding regional aid originated in a
concern to limit the adverse effect of national action on competition
in the common market. Regional policy reflects a desire to balance
support for the kind of unregulated decision making that characterizes
a market system with the promotion o f economic Integration:75
The issue here is the necessary balance between free competition 
and solidarity. The importance of the latter depends upon the 
particular case; it is more likely to outweigh considerations of 
competition In the situations of crisis described in subparagraph 
(a) than In the cases provided for in subparagraph (c) relating 
to aid intended to assist the development of certain activities 
or certain economic regions.
74. See Commission Communication of 23 June 1971 JO 1971 Cl 11/7: 
Resolution of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member 
States, meeting within the Council, on general systems of regional
aid, of 20 October 1971 JO 1971 111 /1 s Communication of the Commission 
on regional aid systems, OJ 1979 C 31/9; Commission Communication of 
1988 OJ 1988, C212/2.
75. Opinion of Advocate General Darmon, Case 248/84 Federal Republic 
of Germany v. E. C. Commission (1987] ECR 4013 at 4031 (1989]




























































































The Commissions objection to regional aid is in part quite
specific to its regional nature:76
In so far as the aid induces firms to choose another location, 
this also constitutes a distortion of competition...for the 
institution of a system ensuring that competition in the common 
market is not distorted...implies that firms should be allowed to 
make up their own mind where to locate and that their choice 
should therefore not be swayed or guided by financial 
inducements.
and
Trade is also affected by the influence which the aid has on the 
location decisions of aided firms. When ... a firm relocates 
from one Member State to another, both the relocation itself and 
the production at, and the supply of output from, the new 
location change trade patterns between Member States.
In other respects, the Commission's objection to regional aid is
quite general:77
The aid in issue in the present case distorts competition because 
it calculably improves the recipient's return on his investment, 
thereby strengthening his financial position compared with 
competitors who do not receive such assistance.
Level of Regional Development
A 1986 Commission decision, involving a Federal Republic of 
Germany regional aid program, makes clear that the standard for 
regional aid is the level of regional development relative to the 
Community as a whole, not relative to the average of the state 
proposing the aid:78
76. Ibid.
77. Commission Decision 87/15 of 19 February 1986 on the 
compatibility with the common market of aid under the German 
Federal/Land Government Joint Regional Aid Programme (Joint Programme 
for the improvement of regional economic structures) in six labour 
market regions OJ 1987 L 12/17 at 21.
78. Ibid, at 22. See also Case 248/84 Federal Republic of Germany




























































































In applying the principles set out above in its scrutiny of 
regional aid schemes, the Commission must satisfy itse lf that the 
regions concerned are suffering from problems which are serious 
enough, in comparison with the rest of the Community, to justify 
the grant of aid at the level proposed.
The only circumstances in which the effect on trading conditions 
caused by regional aid can be regarded as not against the common 
interest are where it can be shown that the aided region suffers 
from difficulties that are relatively severe by Community 
standards, that without the aid market forces would not eliminate 
these difficulties, that the level of aid is in proportion to the 
difficulties and that the grant of aid does not unduly distort 
competition in particular sectors.
The Commission has developed systematic procedures for the
comparison of regional and Community development:79 *
To ensure that its Community-related assessment is systematic and 
objective, the Commission has developed a method of determining, 
for a given Member State, general threshold levels of structural 
unemployment and per capita gross domestic product from 
which regional aid can be deemed acceptable. These thresholds 
are regularly reviewed in the light of the latest figures.
The thresholds for a given Member State are decided in the light
of its relative position in comparison with the Community average.
The thresholds for more developed Member States are more restrictive.
The kind of information considered by the Commission when
evaluating regional aid schemes is illustrated by the Commission's
discussion of a proposed measure of employment aid for Sicily:30
79. Commission Decision 87/15 of 19 February 1986 OJ 1987 L 12/17 at
23. See Communication of the Commission on regional aid systems OJ 
1979 C31/9.
80. E. C. Commission, Sixth Report on Competition Policy.




























































































Net per capita incomes range between 547 and 667 of the 
national average...between 357 and 427 of the Community average. 
...The population of the three provinces has declined 
considerably. Between 1961 and 1971 .... a net fall of between 
47. and 127 was recorded...The population of Sicily as a whole 
declined by 17...as against an increase of some 77 in the total 
population of Italy...Emigration rates from the [three) provinces 
...for the period 1961-1971 were with a few exceptions higher 
than in any other Italian provinces. ...the employment situation 
is poor. In 1973 the percentage of persons in employment in 
Sicily amounted to only 257 of the total population, as against 
an Italian average of 327.
On the basis of these considerations, the Commission found the 
aid program concerned to be compatible with the common market, even 
though it caused total aid to the affected areas to exceed the aid 
levels usually permitted.
Infrastructure Investment
A 1987 decision clarifies the import of Community policy toward 
state aids for a Creek business aid program, and in so doing provides 
insight into recent developments into aid related to infrastructure 
investment:81 *
With regard to the exceptions provided for in Article 92(3)(a), 
aid to promote the economic development of areas where the 
standard of living is abnormally low or where there is serious 
under-employment, while Greece may be regarded as meeting these 
definitions, the concept of regional development to which this 
exception is linked is based essentially on the provision of aid 
for new investment or major expansions or conversions of 
undertakings Involving large-scale investments of a physical 
nature and the costs associated with these. In the case of Law 
1386/1983 the interventions of the BRO in respect of companies 
that have fallen into financial difficulties and the consequent 
restoration of their balance cannot be said to fall under the 
prescriptions of this exception.
Thus Article 92(3)(a) is seen by the Commission as permitting aid to 
investment programs that will support regional development. Rescue 
aid for individual companies does not fall within this category.
81. Commission Decision 88/167 of 7 October 1987 concerning Law
1386/1983 by which the Creek Government grants aid to Creek industry 




























































































The Commission has increasingly stressed that regional aid will
only be permissible under Article 92(3)(c) where it involves initial
investment or job creation. An example would be infrastructure
investment to allow a region to exploit natural resources:82
The Federal Government stated that, in the labour market region 
of Miesbach, the emphasis of such aid was on small, mainly 
family, businesses. The Commission has established that this is 
also true of such aid in the tourist areas of the labour market 
region of Landsberg. In these circumstances, it can be assumed 
that in neither labour market region does the aid for developing 
tourism affect tourist trade flows to an extent contrary to the 
common interest, if at all. In arriving at this conclusion, the 
Commission has taken into account the fact that the parts of both 
labour market regions designed by the Federal Government as 
tourist areas have the natural amenities for tourism, but lack 
the facilities. Aid could enable the facilities to be improved 
and the natural amenities of the areas to be utilized. In these 
circumstances, aid for developing tourism may be deemed 
compatible with the common market under Article 92 (3 ) (c).
As for Article 92(3)(c), it Justifies regional aid programs with
a "pump-priming" or social Investment function:83
The exemption provided for in Article 92 (3)(c) is applicable to 
aid which facilitates the development of certain economic areas 
without at the same time adversely affecting trading conditions 
to an extent contrary to the common interest.
The effect on trading conditions caused by regional aid can be 
regarded as not being contrary to the common interest where it 
can be shown that the aided region suffers from difficulties that 
are relatively severe by Community standards, that without the 
aid market forces would not eliminate these difficulties, and 
that the grant of aid would not unduly distort competition in 
particular sectors.
This clause permits aid in situations where the market would work 
too slowly, or not at all, to resolve the perceived problem.
82. Commission Decision 87/15 of 19 February 1986 OJ 1987 L 12/17 at 
25, 26.
83. Commission Decision 88/318 of 2 March 1988 concerning on Law No 




























































































Developments Related to European Unification
The Commission showed considerable concern to secure the
abolition of preferential rediscount rates prior to 1 July 1968, when
the common market was to come into force.84 One might expect to
find corresponding concerns during the period preceding the completion
of the internal market. Indeed, in the Sixteenth Report on Competition
Policy, the Commission stated that 85
The Community's efforts to complete a single unified internal 
market by 1992...lend added weight and importance to the 
enforcement of the competition rules, and in particular the rules 
on State aid.
This has meant a refinement of policy regarding regional aid. As 
the Commission has noted,86
The entry of Spain and Portugal, coming after that of Greece, has 
made it necessary for the Commission to refine its methods and 
criteria for assessing regional aid in the so-called 'peripheral' 
regions of the Community....The economic and social problems of 
these areas, which are predominantly agricultural, industrially 
underdeveloped and have widespread underemployment, call for a 
certain rethinking of the Commission's policy toward regional 
aid.
More generally, the Commission now concentrates on issues that 
have become a matter of priority as a result of the Single European 
Act. Thus87
The new Title V of Part Three of the EEC Treaty, Article 130A, 
requires the Community to 'develop and pursue its actions leading 
to the strengthening of its economic and social cohesion" and, in 
particular, to aim at 'reducing disparities between the various 
regions and the backwardness of the least-favoured regions'.
84. See the facts in Cases 6/69 & 11/69 Re Export Credits: E. C. 
Commission v. France (1969) ECR 523 (1970) CMLR 43.
85. E. C. Commission, Sixteenth Report on Competition Policy. 
Brussels, 1987, p. 135. ~





























































































In the promotion of Community economic and social cohesion, the 
Commission distinguishes between regional aid treated under Article 
92(3)(a), which covers aid to chronically depressed areas, and that 
treated under Article 92(3Xc), which permits developmental aid that 
does not affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common 
interest.
The willingness to assist severely depressed areas has led the
Commission to modify its long-standing hostility toward operating aid:88
Article 92(3)(a) regions are those suffering abnormally
low living standards or serious underemployment where the
per capita gross domestic product does not exceed 75Z of the
Community average.......the assessment is made relative to
the Community average. Given the particularly severe 
development problems faced in such regions, the Commission 
has decided that it may allow operating aids in some 
circumstances.
Such a possibility remains foreclosed in less depressed areas:89
Regions falling under Article 92(3)(c) are those with more 
general development problems in relation to the national as well 
as the Community situation. Often they suffer from the decline 
of traditional industries and are frequently located in the more 
central prosperous parts of the Community. In its Article 
92(3)(c) method, the Commission has established a system which 
takes account of national regional problems and places them in a 
Community context. ...The better the position of a Member State 
relative to the Community situation, the wider must be the 
disparity of a region in order to justify the award of aid.
...the Commission does not in principle allow the award of 
operating aid in Article 92 (3)(c) regions, and aid must be linked 
to initial investment and/or job creation.
88. E. C. Commission, Eighteenth Report on Competition Policy.
Brussels, 1989, p. 147. For an application, see Commission Decision 
88/318 of 2 March 1988 on Law No 64 of 1 March 1986 on aid to the 
Mezzogiorno OJ 1988 L 143/37.
89. E. C. Commission, Eighteenth Report on Competition Policy.





























































































The new horizontal policies - environmental policy, the programme 
for small and medium-sized enterprises, and others - take as their 
starting-point the desirability of aid to accomplish certain goals.
The presumption implied in the formal legal structure of Article 92 
and established in past Commission practice may be reversed.
Article 92(3)(b) allows the Commission to exempt state aid 
related to important projects of common European interest. Projects 
which for example seek to protect the environment may meet this 
qualification:90 91
...a project may be described as being of common European 
interest when it forms part of the European trans-national 
programmes supported jointly by the various governments acting 
together or when it is connected with concerted action taken by 
the various Member States to combat a common problem, for example 
the pollution of the environment.
What is problematical, however, is the effect for competition policy.
The horizontal policies cannot easily be reconciled with a reliance on 
the market as a mechanism for resource allocation.
Environmental Policy
The first guidelines concerning environmental aid were produced 
in November 1974.91 The Commission endorsed the "polluter pays" 
principle, and indicated that firms should normally bear the cost of 
investments needed to comply with environmental laws. At the time, 
however, the Community was perceived as lagging behind in 
environmental protection. For this reason, the guidelines permitted
90. Joined Cases 62/87 and 72/87 Exécutif Régional Wallon and 
Glaverbel SA v. E. C. Commission Judgment of 8 March 1988,
Report for the Hearing, p. 8.
91. E. C. Commission, Fourth Report on Competition Policy.




























































































state aid up to a specified ceiling for this purpose during a 6-year
transitional period (1975-1980).92 Interpretation of these
guidelines was relatively strict;93
...the Commission also considered that, even confined to anti- 
pollution investments, the aid was incompatible with the common 
market, since firms should bear the costs of eliminating their 
own pollution, and should only be assisted in doing this if it 
could be shown that they were experiencing difficulties in making 
the necessary adaptations to their existing production plants.
The 1974 guidelines were supplemented in 1980.9"1 At this
time, the transitional period was extended through 1986. The
guidelines were extended again in 1986, by which time the Commission
was beginning to rethink the whole basis of its environmental
policy;95
However, developments in the years since 1974 have changed the 
context of environmental policy. The process has culminated in 
the environmental provisions of the Single European Act. which 
states that 'Action by the Community relating to the environment 
shall be based on the principles that preventive action should be 
taken, that environmental damage should as a priority be 
rectified at the source, and that the polluter shall pay. 
Environmental protection requirements shall be a component of the 
Community's other policies'... These developments call into 
question the concept of a purely transitional approach since it 
is now clear that improvement in the environment and the need to 
avoid distortions of competition caused by national measures in 
this field will remain a major task for an indefinite period.
92. See E. C. Commission, Sixth Report on Competition Policy.
Brussels, April 1977, pp. 127-131 for instances in which the 
Commission approved and did not approve aid under these 
guidelines.
93. Commission Decision 77/260 of 22 March 1977 concerning aid 
planned by the Belgian Government towards the extension of capacity of 
an oil refinery at Antwerp OJ 1977 L 80/23.
94. E. C. Commission, Tenth Report on Competition Policy.
Brussels, 1981, pp. 157-158.
95. E. C. Commission, Sixteenth Report on Competition Policy.




























































































Under present guidelines, environmental aid qualifies for an 
Article 92(3)(b) exemption as an important project of common European 
interest if96 97
(i) the aid is intended to facilitate the implementation of 
new environmental standards;
(ii) the net grant equivalent of the aid does not exceed 15% of 
the value of the aided investment:
(lii) only firms have installations in operation for at least
two years before the entry into force of the environmental 
standards in question,-
(iv) the eligible firm bears the entire cost of normal 
replacement investment and operating costs.
These guidelines suggest that market failure no longer has the 
decisive significance one attributed to it as a condition for the 
acceptability of state aid. It is notable that the guidelines are 
broadly interpreted. Listings of instances of state aid to which the 
Commission does not object [published in the annex of the annual 
Report on Competition Policy! indicate that the Commission permits 
numerous instances of aid aimed at protecting the environment.
Research & Development
While the main concern of sectoral policy has been the management 
of structural excess capacity, a subsidiary purpose has been to 
promote technological competitiveness. By coordinating investment in 
innovation, the Commission seeks in effect to minimize a kind of 
"technological excess capacity;"37
96. Ibid.
97. E. C. Commission, Eighth Report on Competition Policy. 




























































































For other industries the Commission's action has been much more 
limited, and has been confined to those, such as computers, 
certain areas of electronics and aerospace, in which, because of 
the strength of competition from producers in third countries, 
the Community industry has proved unable to take full advantage 
of a rapid growth in demand. In these cases the Commission has 
laid particular stress on the need to avoid a duplication of 
efforts and has accordingly argued for collaboration between 
Member States on some projects and more generally for a 
coordination of national measures. It has in general been 
favourably disposed to aids which are granted within a 
coordinated framework of this kind and particularly to those for 
research and development.
Underlying this policy is an evident belief in market failure, as
regards technological advance.98 State aid is seen as a device
for improving on the performance of the unaided market.
Because the market is seen as generating a less-than-optimal
level of investment in research and development, there is a general
presumption in favor aid for research and development:99
...the Commission has traditionally taken a favourable view 
...when it has come to scrutinize individual schemes under 
Article 92 ... This ..is justified by ...the aims of such aid, 
the often considerable financing requirements for R&D, the risks 
attached and, given the distance from the market place of such 
projects, the reduced likelihood of distortions of competition or 
trade between Member States.
Aid for research and development to promote an important project 
of common European interest may be exempted under Article 92(3)(b).
The Commission has approved aid granted by the Netherlands for the 
development of a common standard for high-definition colour television 
on this basis.100
98. See the remarks on state to the electronic data processing 
industry in E. C. Commission, Second Report on Competition Policy, 
p. 93, where it is clear that the market for financial capital is seen 
as the source of market failure.
99. Community Framework for State Aids for Research and Development 
OJ 1986 C 83/2.
100. E. C. Commission, Eighteenth Report on Competition Policy. 




























































































The Commission enjoys the discretion to decide whether or not a
particular project is important and of common European interest. This
involves not only an evaluation of the innovative nature of the
project, but also a consideration of market factors:101
The mere fact that the investments envisaged enabled new 
technology to be used does not make the project one of common 
European interest; that certainly cannot be the case when... 
the products have to sold on a saturated market.
Where the activity being aided does not involve an important
project of common European interest, an exemption may be made based on
Article 92(3)(c). For this to be possible, the Commission must
determine that the aid does not adversely affect trading conditions to
an extent contrary to the common interest.
A series of Commission decisions makes clear that aid which would
otherwise run fail to qualify for one of the Article 92 exemptions
cannot be saved by characterizing it as R&D aid. Commission practice
is carefully to scrutinize individual aid packages, to assure itself
that the aided activity is genuinely innovative in character. Modest
technical improvements and routine refittings of equipment will not
101. Joined Cases 62/87 and 72/87 Exécutif Régional Wallon and
Glaverbel SA v. E. C. Commission Judgment of 8 March 1988, 




























































































qualify, even if they embody some technological progress.102 
Small- and Medium-Sized Enterprise
Aid for small and medium-sized enterprise was initially seen as a 
means of assisting such firms to overcome their peculiar difficulties:103
(1) limited access to markets for financial capital:
(2) small size not justified by economic need;
(3) greater difficulty adapting to technological, industrial,
and commercial developments:
(4) acquiring information needed to extend operations to the
Community scale and beyond.
The Commission has consistent maintained a positive attitude 
toward SMEs, because of the role they are seen as playing in a market 
economy;104 *
As in previous years, one of the Commission's main concerns in 
the competition policy area was its concern to strengthen and 
preserve small and medium-sized enterprises...as an essential 
element in a healthy and competitive environment. ...such 
businesses form one of the basic foundations of the European 
economy because of the contribution they make to the competitive 
structure of the market, their flexibility and their dynamism.
102. See Commission Decision 87/16 of 23 April 1986 on a proposal by 
the Italian Government to grant aid to a firm in the chemical industry 
(producing industrial auxiliaries, intermediates and pesticides) OJ
1987 L 12/27; Commission Decision 87/194 of 12 November 1986 on a FIM 
loan to a mineral-water and glass-water manufacturer OJ 1987 L 77/43; 
Commission Decision 87/303 of 14 January 1987 on an FIM (industrial 
Modernization Fund) loan to a brewery OJ 1987 L 152/27; and Commission 
Decision 89/254 of 15 November 1988 relating to aid which the Belgian 
Government has granted to a petrochemicals company at Ottignies/ 
Louvaln-la-Neuve (SA Belgian Shell) OJ 1989 L 106/34. For a positive 
decision, see Commission Decision 89/305 of 21 December 1988 
concerning aid from the French Government to an undertaking in the 
motor vehicle sector - Peugeot SA OJ 1989 L 123/53.
103. E. C. Commission, Sixth Report on Competition Policy.
Brussels, 1977, p. 132.
104. E. C. Commission, Seventeenth Report on Competition Policy.
Brussels, 1988, p. 29. See also COM(86) 445 final, 20 September 1986




























































































The Commission allows more generous levels of aid for research
and development if the aid is directed toward SMEs:105
...the Commission considers that, as a general rule, the level of 
aid for basic industrial research should not be more than 50 7. of 
the gross costs of the project or programme. As the activity 
being aided gets nearer to the market place, i.e. covers the 
areas of applied research and development, the Commission in its 
examination and evaluation of national proposals will look in 
principle for progressively lower levels of aid.
Special allowance can also be made for aids directed 
genuinely at smaller and medium-sized enterprises in this case 
for example, aids may be acceptable at levels 10 percentage 
points higher than in other cases.
However, an otherwise unacceptable aid package is unlikely to be 
saved by characterizing it as targeting small and medium-sized firms.
In one case involving a proposed program of aid for southern 
Italy,106
The Italian authorities argue that the industrial base of the 
region [between Rome and Naples) consists mainly of small to 
medium-sized firms in mature industries which are vulnerable to 
foreign competition, especially from Spain and Portugal. Without 
such aid for the services sector, the process of replacing 
obsolete activities and introducing technological innovation and 
new industry would come to a halt.
The Commission rejected this argument, partly because market 
forces seemed capable of preserving a place for small and medium-sized 
firms:107
...the economy of the Centre-North also has this structure.
There, decentralization and a swing away from vertical 
integration have produced a new pattern of industry based on 
smaller units.
105. Community framework for state aids for research and development 
0J 1986 C 83/2 p. 4.
106. Commission Decision 88/318 of 2 March 1988 on Law No 64 of 1 






























































































Programmes of state aid that have the effect of increasing 
employment will often be found acceptable, particularly if they also 
involve the promotion of research and development or small and medium­
sized firms. Thus in 1986 the Commission approved portions of a 
Belgian regional aid program:108 109
The provisions not contested by the Commission were a partial 
relief from corporation tax for six years for companies which 
before 31 December 1987 reduce their weekly working hours by at 
least 8/. and correspondingly increase their workforce, and a 
partial relief from corporation tax for 10 years for ’innovative' 
companies employing less than 100 people engaged in the 
exploitation of new high technologies.
The Commission raised no objection to these parts of the 
Act, because they were in line with stated Commission policy to 
encourage employment by reducing working hours and to promote 
small and medium-sized enterprises, particularly in high- 
technology sectors.
However, claims are carefully scrutinised. Aid will not be 
exempted merely because it may indirectly protect employment and the 
pay levels of employees. In a decision where this issue was raised,
109the Commission stated
The Belgian authorities also pointed out in their comments that 
the investment would not only maintain the jobs of 336 persons, 
but would also lead over the next few years to the recruitment of 
several hundred workers in the district bordering on the Tumhout 
area, which qualifies for regional assistance and where the rate 
of unemployment is particularly high. However, this knock-on 
effect is by no means assured and at this Juncture the effect of 
the aid on the employment situation in the Tumhout area cannot 
be assessed.
108. E. C. Commission, Sixteenth Report on Competition Policy. 
Brussels, 1987, p. 138.
109. Commission Decision 81/984 of 23 November 1981 on a Belgian 
Government proposal to  aid certain investments in a refinery at 




























































































VII. Trends in Commission Practice
A. Early Presumption in Favor of the Market Mechanism
Community policy has been to give preference to the unaided 
market if possible, as a way of organizing trade. For example, in 
Re aids to the textile industry: Italy v. E. C. Commission Ita ly
attempted to turn the effect of the reduction in social charges on 
competition into an affirmative defense. Social charges on Italian 
textile firms, it argued, were higher than those on competitors in 
other member States. The reduction in social charges simply 
eliminated this disadvantage and could not, therefore, be considered a 
distortion of trade. The general issue raised by this argument is the 
appropriate reference point for deciding whether or not there is a 
distortion of competition. Here the Court was clear that distortions 
of competition were to be assessed with reference to the pre-aid 
situation;110
...in the application of Article 92(1 )the point of departure 
must necessarily be the competitive position existing within 
the common market before the adoption of the measure in issue.
Similarly, in Firma Steinike und Weinlig v. Bundesamt fur
Emahrung und Forstwirtschaft111 the FRG sought to defend an aid program
for German agriculture, food industries, and forestry on the ground
that similar programs were carried on in other member States. The
110. Case 173/73 (1974) ECR 709 at 720 (1974) 2 CMLR 593 at 607.





























































































Any breach by a member-State of an obligation under the Treaty in 
connection with the prohibition laid down in A rtic le  92 
cannot be justified by the fact that other member-States are 
also failing to fulfill this obligation. The effects of more 
than one distortion of competition on trade between member-States 
do not cancel one another out but accumulate and the damaging 
consequences to the Common Market are increased.
I f  there is only one distortion to competition, economic theory
teaches that removing the distortion will improve welfare. If there
is more than one distortion to competition, the theory of the second
best teaches that removing only one of them need not improve welfare.113
The Court in Firma Steinike and Weinlig goes beyond economic theory
and affirms a policy reliance in the undistorted competitive process
112. Case 78/76 (1977) ECR 595 at 598 (1977) 2 CMLR 688 at 723. 
a similar approach when applying Article 46 of the Treaty to 
countervailing duties, see Case 337/82 St Nikolaus Brennerei und 
Likorfabrik v. Hauptzollamt Krefeld (1984) ECR 1051 (1985)
3 CMLR 83.
113. Monopoly reduces welfare because it results in an output 
restriction and a shift of resources to the production of products 
that are, from a social point of view, less desirable. If output is 
restricted in only one market, and the restriction is eliminated, net 
welfare must rise, because output rises in a market where output is 
more valuable and falls in a market where output is less valuable, 
from a social point of view. I f there are output restrictions in 
several markets, however, elimination of output restriction in one 
market may draw resources from some other market in which output is 
restricted. It may well be that output in the market from which 
resources are withdrawn is worth more, from a social point of view, 
that output in the market in which output restriction is eliminated.
In this case, the effect of a partial elimination of output 
restriction will be to reduce overall welfare. See Lipsey, R. G. and 
Lancaster, Kelvin "The General Theory of the Second Best,” Review of 





























































































as a device for obtaining satisfactory performance in the common market.1H
Consistent with this precept, when confronted with 
counterbalancing state aids, the Commission's response has been to try 
to eliminate all of them.* 115 Where elimination has not been possible, 
the Commission has sought to equalize the level of subsidy.116 
B. An Emerging Presumption in Favor of Certain Types of Aid?
On the other hand, the so-called "accompanying" or "flanking" 
policies, including regional policy, environmental policy, social 
policy, and the promotion of economic and social cohesion, were given 
a boost by the Single European Act. This boost may be reflected in 
recent trends in Commission practice.
New horizontal policies, such as environmental policy and the 
programme for small- and medium-sized enterprises, take as their 
starting-point the desirability of aid to accomplish certain goals.
The presumption implied In the formal structure of Article 92 and
U lft .«This is consistent with an early characterization of the 
relation between state aid and the formation of the common market:
...there is no real common market in an industry straddling 
several countries if one of those countries subsidizes its own 
industry.
(Opinion of Advocate General Lagrange, Case 30/59 De Gezamenlijke 
Steenkolenmijnen In Limburg v. ECSC High Authority (1961)
ECR1 at 41.)
115. See Commission Decision 79/496 of 2 May 1979 on the United 
Kingdom scheme of assistance in the form of interest relief grants in 
favour of the offshore supplies industry (offshore supplies relief 
grant, OSIRG) OJ 1979 L 127/50 at 50.
116. Commission Decision 88/437 of 20 January 1988 concerning aids 
planned by the French Government in favour of a shipbuilding contract 
for which there is competition between yards in several Member States 




























































































established by past Commission practice may be reversed. Restriction 
of the grant of aid promoting the aims of horizontal practices may be 
permissible only where unjustified distortion of competition can be 
established.
State aid is increasingly seen as a vehicle for making the
completion o f the internal market politically acceptable:117
The problem also has to be seen in the context of wider policies 
which 1992 will bring about. The most important of these is that 
of coherence of the economies of the Member States and 
particularly the development of the more peripheral and poorer 
regions of the Community. The Commission has recognized this by 
bringing into play the derogation of Article 92(3)(a) EEC which 
allows high levels of State aid to be given in these regions...
There appears to be an increased willingness to use state aid as
a device to resolve political problems. Suitably controlled, state
aid can bolster political consensus in favor of economic union, by
ensuring that the benefits produced by such a union are distributed in
a way that is perceived as fair.
VIII. Conclusion
By its implementation of Treaty provisions regarding state aid, 
the Commission reveals a belief that markets work well in the long run 
but can benefit from selective prodding in the short- and medium-run.
The benefits of economic union are seen as flowing from the 
unrestricted play of market forces, but the Commission will accept 
distortions of competition to speed the rate at which markets move 
toward long-run, competitive, equilibrium.
State aid, even operating aid, may be permitted in severely 
depressed areas, to promote employment and development. State aid may 





























































































excess capacity. State aid may be permitted to promote genuinely 
innovative projects of common interest. However, aid which simply 
keeps unhealthy concerns alive or postpones their inevitable day of 
reckoning slows the market adjustment process, and is not permitted.
The Commission also recognizes political imperatives. Hence the 
Commission is increasingly prepared to accept the grant of aid merely 
because, for example, it facilitates the raising of environmental 
standards or encourages small and medium-sized enterprise.
The challenge faced by the Commission, in 1992 and beyond, is to 
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